by Michael Taggart
Cryptocurrency and malware: a match made in heaven. Let's learn how to read the ledger and extract malware config.
This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://ifin-intel.org/blog/etherhiding/
by Michael Taggart
Cryptocurrency and malware: a match made in heaven. Let's learn how to read the ledger and extract malware config.
I have an expansion of my f-crypto block list the article links to. Some of them are still completely active, albeit a bit unreliable, and many have goodbye pages or now defunct.
I don’t really trust the “defunct” to stay that way or who knows what’ll pick it up when they expire. So I’ll probably split them within the file of longer operational (no regret block list) vs something you may hunt on in the active list—I’m focusing on the RPC nodes in particular.
I’ll try to get that updated next week.
I could not find a good overview of addresses that can be tied to malicious purposes, so I created my own. Some are reported on before, others were found in ClickFix campaigns.
While researching this I also came across a GitHub repository by BlueTeamCoolTeam and related blogpost by Luke Wilkinson who tried to map all known EtherHiding campaigns.
0x08207b087f61d7e95e441e15fd6d40befd6ed308 “Analytics” ErrTrafficSince March 11, 2026, the Polygon address
0x08207b087f61d7e95e441e15fd6d40befd6ed308has created over 15 smart contracts that host domains that are used in the latest ErrTraffic campaigns.
Source: Err-Hiding and Seek: How ErrTraffic v3 Leverages EtherHiding in ClickFix Campaign | levelblue.com
The “Analytics” ErrTraffic cluster, previously documented by LevelBlue and other threat reports, relies on the Polygon blockchain and the cryptocurrency wallet address
0x08207B087F61d7e95E441E15fd6d40BEfd6eD308to retrieve the C2 domains and fetch Vidar infostealer payloads during April and May 2026.
Source: Unveiling ErrTraffic: inside a growing ClickFix malware distribution framework | sekoia.com
0x5db7412c80269c3929a380d8b90b62d96a765e5a ErrTrafficCreated multiple contracts with what looks like ErrTraffic communication patterns.
First activity: 2026-04-03 18:39:59Z. Last activity: 2026-05-16 20:43:36Z.
Contracts/StorageDomains: 0xcdcb5202eb1113f268be3a7d539b2d00ea32e533, 0x09fec98ebea568b5adbfaddd037eaa14c3f970c8, 0x4b411c4adf2ccd1f19549cc7283961bdc030f963, 0xa27f4e3170d52413dc588bc76ea603c3ff1dba62, 0x5a901b8d2ad9665c06a9c80117252b1c48786eee, 0xf0cc93ff08f5462aaa2a0612dc6af14779041bef, 0xe576897f13ea261c7b686489fb1b35c8d806884e, 0xe12894c1efab3551a93c6f65ef13a82da28723da, 0xcb183180e566f5b6f003fe3832b511595b2ce5cb, 0xf50c07986e9a9d96743aac66f4da8788d3f32ecc.
0xcdcb5202eb1113f268be3a7d539b2d00ea32e533The content is not obfuscated and does not contain Javascript but a C2 domain.
There is a single domain transaction setText with content tofartinthesummer.com on 2026-04-05 04:40:09 UTC.
Based on historic observations on URLScan.io, the URL https://tofartinthesummer.com/api/css.js?b=c640b5df&r=854220 returned obfuscated Javascript with characteristic if(window.TextDecoder){try{return new TextDecoder("utf-8").decode(arr);}catch(e){}}var tmp=. A second request to https://tofartinthesummer.com/api/index.php?q=ww0mC8lsqy6jBeXOuQ returned a JSON object with "enc":"gcm1" and keys q and q2. This is backend communication is identical to ErrTraffic as described by LevelBlue.
0x09fec98ebea568b5adbfaddd037eaa14c3f970c8The content is not obfuscated and does not contain Javascript but a C2 domain.
There is a single domain transaction setText with content tofartinthesummer.com on 2026-04-05 21:43:09 UTC.
0xe12894c1efab3551a93c6f65ef13a82da28723daThere are no transactions with this “StorageDomain” contract that allows to set/get a domainname.
The default contact is https://nevertiredflowers.lol.
Created on 2026-04-19 11:18:20.
0xcb183180e566f5b6f003fe3832b511595b2ce5cbThere are no transactions with this “StorageDomain” contract that allows to set/get a domainname.
The default contact is http://46.226.163.128 (AS210644, Aeza Group LLC).
Created on 2026-05-08 09:58:10.
0xf50c07986e9a9d96743aac66f4da8788d3f32eccThere are no transactions with this “StorageDomain” contract that allows to set/get a domainname.
The default contact is https://bigflopenergy.com.
Created on 2026-05-16 20:43:36.
0xcaf2c54e400437da717cf215181b170f65187abfFirst activity on 2024-10-17 11:09:36. This contact is still active, with recent activity on 2026-07-17 13:14:42.
This is the contract creator for multiple contracts and domain updates.
0xb36482fe794b895695914779db3909b471d1aa43 “Bintang” ErrTrafficThis contract does not obfuscate the content and stores a URL. Function name: newDomain.
Observed entries: https://mrllvd.beer (2026-03-12 1:55:39) and https://cloud-safe.click (2026-03-12 8:57:37)
We dubbed this campaign “Bintang”, after the popular Indonesian beer to reflect the link between the “Beer” cluster and Indonesian patterns identified within the operator’s toolkit.
Source: Unveiling ErrTraffic: inside a growing ClickFix malware distribution framework | sekoia.com
0xa1decfb75c8c0ca28c10517ce56b710baf727d2eRelates to ClearFake according to LevelBlue.
0x9A4752cAA1C15868487A0ACb691F81bfA901E063: First activity on Invalid date.0x839d1cE5c3F259e8d3D17114d7186EDabdbeA94b: First activity on Invalid date.0x6d2c5435EF70196740a48904B69377935D50abBB: First activity on Invalid date.As reported by PGrass on the malicious Wordpress plugin “Delta Tracker Fix” VirusTotal. The smart contract data payload is XOR encoded, with the first byte as the key length, then X bytes the key followed by the rest of the bytes as XOR encoded text. Decoded it reveals (up to) three unique URL’s.
The interesting part related to EtherHiding is that the RPC calls are made serve-side instead of client-side. For example ErrTraffic and ClearFake use client-side calls. This neutralises detective and preventive measures related to web browser traffic towards RPC nodes.
EDIT: Clarified the decoding method.
| Contract address | Comment |
|---|---|
0x04E25a563f159308FC3E15fE9Ccc9D2CF623D0cc |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x16dA95799CB8aB203f83e01AFC030B1217198Da4 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x1D50703722729dD68e89D819F69eFc5Fb206bBe7 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x27c7c36981c1ed5cFA2DCDb4B43C27A6BaF6bEa8 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x4dcE7d4b1229F3705BDB70341484cF2EEE36432e |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x55b4F951d5Ac035C21B170C73C0A930a641b718C |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x6da31EB2A016074ffd5519326573E78E2677E4C8 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x737791081A398151195a753Fb49f9c1b8bc1fCDB |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x7D2D8A4A6E8D89cf5C151C4f68A521490D9779B0 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x8d2BaEc2687F59eE1EE7BFd322D33325f5E004ee |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xb3EF2D08Bf25a7daB9d8b98d64E564eA1f6Db924 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xb8fB2bfb182A172b29C365AD6CF743449975C418 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xbD6e817Cc510EC3DA5651B5a3AC595d34C0CF1af |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xC37fB924cF5996C9e676BBA399bDfc5F936B3572 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xC41342908f98E813862EDFe47Ac3af676F8098C9 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xc7199C1dbCd82c4E002327Aa3EC9158F434a6aCE |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xCE476E6f4d83a7a086Cbcdf0FE2E8f221e47e81C |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xD69A36439FffD145ADAcacB94fDe6f8b3546a361 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xf9438b4E3200AE1611eD3d03310c803FDdf67672 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xfbC267200f9e5749045f32dbB55BB16615f1CE5F |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xFDB8b139EeacD17ea7c10c256eA77Ba6Dff18D7d |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0xFdfB8c4e827c2d053749C8F2f2058548dde0d073 |
Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address |
0x75cD25791A60ab3451E2d2feB5ec46c6f541C2B8 |
Sample 2 Polygon smart contract address |
0xb0874252a7359AA701F3F144A1f03A6e0DA8aE6D |
Sample 3 Polygon Smart Contract address |
0xcaf2c54e400437da717cf215181b170f65187abf |
LenAI’s primary smart contract address |
Source: The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications