PaperCut Emergency Patch

Ouch.

Last Updated: 2026-09-02T13:00:31Z

What’s Happening

*PaperCut has released an urgent security advisory for PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF as well as two newly discovered CVEs. This includes a Pre-Auth RCE Chain. All NG and MF versions are being considered as potentially affected, and emergency patches for versions 24, 25, and 26 have been released.

Huntress has released an incident response blog mentioning two instances of customer exploitation.

Security Advisory
Huntress Investigation
CVE-2026-82078
CVE-2026-81578

Actions

Immediately disconnect PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF services that are accessible from the internet, ensuring they can only be accessed by trusted IP addresses even if no suspicious activity has been observed. If PaperCut services were exposed publicly, ensure to backup the server/logs directory, the current configuration, process trees originating from pc-app.exe and other system logs such as scheduled tasks, services, etc.

Apply the emergency patch that has been released for customers if you are unable to take other mitigating actions. Do this if you have already applied the first patch as PaperCut has released a second, more hardened, patch.

The patched versions are:

PaperCut MF:

  • 24.1.9 (build 76534)
  • 25.0.12 (build 76532)
  • 26.0.1 (build 76531)

PaperCut NG:

  • 24.1.9 (build 76535)
  • 25.0.12 (build 76533)
  • 26.0.4 (build 76530)

Be on the lookout for any suspicious activity:

  • Alerts from intrusion-detection, endpoint-security, or network-monitoring tools involving the PaperCut Application Server, particularly suspicious post-exploitation activity from pc-app.exe. This is the most reliable detection—shell processes that are a child of PaperCut.
  • Missing, unexpectedly truncated, or deleted PaperCut server.log files.
  • Suspicious outbound SMB2 connections.
  • Udydn.out in /data/content/ path relative to the programs installation directory
  • Any of the following entries in server.log:
    • ERROR No suitable driver found for jdbc:no:x
    • ERROR DatabaseUtils - Database error looking up cardID: VALUES CAST
    • d2hvYW1pICYgdmVy

Notes

PaperCut has noted that the absence of the above indicators is not confirmation that a system has not been affected. PaperCut will publish validated, specific indicators and further guidance as soon as they are available. This IFIN post will be updated when further IoCs are published.

Shodan analysis for attack surface is non-trivial, since PaperCut does not make its full version immediately visible. A baseline search filter looks like:

http.favicon.hash:-1142586156 http.title:"PaperCut Login" port:9191

Now, the auth bypass is on the admin interface, which is by default on port 9191, hence the inclusion above. That interface should never be exposed to the internet.

If you’re looking at a potentially vulnerable server and want to ascertain its exact version, the easiest way I’ve found is to navigate to /app?service=page/Foobar on the port 9191 site. This brings up a not-found error that reports the full version and build number.

Based on these parameters, the attack surface is on the order of hundreds of servers. So bad, but not “widespread” exactly. Still, for organizations (mostly colleges and universities) using PaperCut, an attack could be devastating—especially because those networks tend to have lax network segmentation, and a compromised public web server could easily be a pivot point to the internal network.

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PaperCut updated their advisory with a second “hardening” patch build and references two CVE’s: CVE-2026-82078 (Unsafe Dynamic Class Loading in Database Connector) and CVE-2026-81578 (Authentication Bypass).

Huntress published an incident response blog: PaperCut Actively Exploited: A Pre-Auth RCE Chain. There are not a lot of new indicators, but there are details on one of the actual payloads that was seen. First seen date in the screenshots is 2026-08-26T21:57:04Z.
Huntress notes they have a working Proof-of-Concept and that their “proven chain used an attacker-controlled SMB2 share to deliver the Derby archive”. Outbound SMB connections may be an additional indicator.

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Rapid7 published a blogpost detailing the two vulnerabilities.

Using an auth bypass in the service parameter an attacker can access the configuration editor and change the user database to an (in-memory) Derby instance. The SQL statement config can be set to include function calls, including JavaScript or external Jar/class files. Combining both vulnerabilities allows remote unauthenticated access.

Based on the Rapid7 description, no outbound calls are required. The authentication bypass alone is likely a safe and sufficient vulnerability check. Changing the config should be considered intrusive.

Safe vuln check template here: nuclei-templates/cve/CVE-2026-81578.yaml at main · darses/nuclei-templates · GitHub

Disclosure upfront: I have not fully reproduced the RCE part, but do get the digest of it. The indicators shared make sense, but may be too specific for the cases observed.

I suggest to add the following (server.log) indicator: jdbc:derby: . In addition the logfile /papercut/server/data/internal/derby.log is likely to contain evidence of exploitation, depending on whether this database is (also) used legitimately.

In webserver logging, look for:

  • POST /app?service=direct/1/Home/*
  • POST /app?service=direct/1/Error/*
  • POST /app?service=direct/1/Exception/*

We received confirmation from Papercut that Mobility print is not vulnerable to the vulnerabilities uses against ports 80/443. Mobility Print uses the following ports:

  • 9163 TCP: Used for HTTP client communication and Chrome/Windows payload handling.
  • 9164 TCP: Used for secure HTTPS/IPPS job delivery (macOS, iOS, Android, and Windows).
  • 5353 UDP: Used for mDNS local printer discovery.
  • 53 UDP/TCP: Used if you use DNS-based printer discovery instead of mDNS.
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PaperCut published additional indicators in the form of OS commands executed. The process spawn with command execution (T1059) was already known. Further post-exploitation activity includes downloading files from temporary hosting services (T1105 Tool ingress, sendit.sh) creating a Windows Service (T1569) and installing Remote Access Tools (T1219.002) in the form of AnyDesk and SimpleHelp (LOLRMM).

Looks like WatchTowr is winding up for a blog post and PoC:

Looks like they found more vulnerabilities. The printed version looks like “emergency patch 2”.

With regards to CVE-2026-82078 + CVE-2026-81578 they were already beaten by Stephen Fewer, who submitted a Metasploit PR a few days go: Add exploit module for the recent PaperCut MF/NG 0day (CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078) by sfewer-r7 · Pull Request #21842 · rapid7/metasploit-framework · GitHub

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A bit late, but PapeCut released emergency patch 3 2026-09-01T08:22:00Z.